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THE SEC SAFE HARBOR FOR FORECASTS-A
STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?
A financial forecast projects revenues, profits, earnings per share,
or other features of the economic future of a company. Forecasts may
be presented in prepared announcements or simply through confirma-
tion to securities analysts that their own projections are "in the ball
park."1 These forecasts, along with other "soft information,"'2 are high-
ly relevant to investment decisions because they assess the future pros-
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1. J. Cox 268.
2. "Soft information" is defined as "opinions, predictions, analyses and other subjective
evaluations," as distinguished from "hard information," which is defined as "statements concern-
ing objectively verifiable historical facts." REPORT 347.
One commentator described soft information as follows:
Although a comprehensive definition of soft information is not readily apparent, several
non-exclusive and non-exhaustive categories can be identified: (1) forward-looking
statements concerning the future, such as projections, forecasts, predictions, and state-
ments concerning plans and expectations; (2) statements concerning past or present situ-
ations when the maker of the statement lacks the data necessary to prove its accuracy-
for example, information on a company's historical share of the market, when it does not
have access to precise statistics concerning its competitors; (3) information based prima-
rily on subjective evaluations-for example, representations concerning the competence
or integrity of management, the relative efficiency of a manufacturing operation, or the
appraised value of assets; (4) statements of motive, purpose, or intention, since it is fre-
quently easier to verify objectively what was done than to determine why it was done-
for example, explanation of the reasons for which an auditor has been discharged, (5)
statements involving qualifying words, such as "excellent," "ingenious," "efficient" and
"imaginative," for which there are no generally accepted objective standards of measure-
ment in most contexts.
Schneider 255. Schneider further noted the difficulty involved in classifying certain information:
"'Hard' and 'soft' must be recognized as highly relative concepts suggesting no sharp dividing
line. Many apparently hard statements have soft cores and vice versa." Id. 256.
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pects of a company.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has traditionally pro-
hibited disclosure of most soft information in documents filed with the
Commission, although the information was often disseminated through
informal means such as press releases and other publications. 3 Since
1972, however, the Commission has exhibited a willingness to allow,
and even to encourage, the disclosure of financial forecasts and certain
other soft information.4 A recent example of this change in attitude is
the adoption of Securities Act Regulation section 230.1755 (rule 175),
which provides a "safe harbor" for voluntary disclosure of a "forward-
looking statement."'6
3. It has been the Commission's long-standing policy not to permit projections and
predictions in prospectuses and reports filed with the Commission. Such documents are
designed to elicit material facts. Their factual character is widely recognized. Investors
and their advisors are at liberty to make their own projections based on the disclosures
resulting from the Commission's requirements. A real danger exists, in the Study's judg-
ment, that projections appearing in prospectuses and other documents filed under the
securities laws and reviewed by the Commission would be accorded a greater measure of
validity by the unsophisticated than they would deserve.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A REAPPRAISAL OF FED-
ERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 96 (1969) (the "Wheat Report"),
summarizedin [Special Studies 1963-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 74,601; see
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973); Fiflis 97. See generally
Sowards, The "~eat Report and Reform of Federal Securities Regulation, 23 VAND. L. REV. 495
(1970) (general discussion of the Wheat Report).
4. In 1972 the SEC held public hearings to study estimates, forecasts, and projections. Sec.
Exch. Act Release No. 9844, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79, 075. The
next year it issued a policy statement declaring its intention to promulgate rules for disclosure of
projections. Sec. Act Release No. 5362, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
79,211. See text accompanying notes 53-55 infra. The SEC next proposed a complicated and
detailed set of rules in 1975. Sec. Act Release No. 5581, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 80,167. Due to heavy criticism, thd Commission withdrew the proposed rules one
year later. Sec. Act. Release No. 5699. See notes 68-76 infra and accompanying text. In 1976 the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, a study committee appointed by the SEC, began
an examination of the corporate disclosure system. It submitted a two-volume report at the con-
clusion of its investigation in 1978. REPORT. The SEC issued a generally favorable response to
the Advisory Committee's recommendations and authorized the Division of Corporation Finance
to draft recommendations. Sec. Act Release No. 5906, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,505. Later in 1978 the SEC adopted "guides" for disclosing projections of future
economic performance, Sec. Act Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,756, and proposed a safe harbor rule for projections, Sec. Act ReleaseNo. 5993. See
notes 136-39 infra and accompanying text. The SEC adopted a safe harbor rule on June 25, 1979.
Sec. Act Release No. 6084. See note 83 infra.
5. 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810 (1979); Sec. Act Reg. § 230.175, [1979] 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
3715. Part of the text of rule 175 is quoted in note 83 infra.
6. For the purpose of rule 175, the term "forward-looking statement" is defined as follows:
(1) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (loss), earnings (loss) per
share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure or other financial items;
(2) a statement of management's plans and objectives for future operations;
(3) a statement of future economic performance contained in management's discussion
and analysis of the summary of earnings (as called for by Guides 22 and 1 under the
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The purpose of the rule is to encourage disclosure of projections,
both in Commission filings and elsewhere, by protecting issuers and
management 7 from liability for misleading investors if projections are
made in good faith and have a reasonable basis.8 This Comment will
examine the purposes of the safe harbor provision and the development
of the current rule. It will then analyze the provisions of rule 175, em-
phasizing alternative approaches that would clarify the rule and en-
courage disclosure by increasing management's protection from
liability.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEC's POLICY FAVORING FORECAST
DISCLOSURE
A. Arguments Against Disclosure of Forecasts.
For many years, the Securities and Exchange Commission's poli-
cies largely excluded soft information from Commission documents.9
Issuers, underwriters, and their attorneys generally acquiesced in this
exclusionary policy as a matter of self-protection.' 0 Although the
Commission has been retreating gradually from this position, it is im-
portant to review the reasons for the exclusionary policy because many
of the same concerns continue to influence the development of the
Commission's policies regarding forecast disclosure.'
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and by instruction 5 to
the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q); or
(4) disclosed statements of the assumptions underlying or relating to any of the state-
ments described in (1), (2), or (3) above.
44 Fed. Reg. 38,810 (1979). In the interest of brevity, future references to forward-looking infor-
mation of the type covered by the safe harbor will be referred to as projections or forecasts.
7. The rule covers projections made "by or on behalf of an issuer or by an outside reviewer
retained by the issuer." 44 Fed. Reg. 38,812 (1979).
8. Sec. Act Release No. 6084, at 81,938.
9. See note 3 supra. The SEC formerly permitted disclosure of specified soft information
only. For example, the Commission tolerated disclosure of soft information filed in relation to
acquisitions, tender offers, and proxy contests-situations in which an investor needs fair as op-
posed to conservative disclosure. In addition, disclosure of certain negative soft information was
sometimes mandatory. For example, the SEC has required disclosure on such subjects as plant
efficiency, management integrity, labor relations, anticipated changes in a company's competitive
position, and trends reflected in recent interim earnings when that information was negative.
Moreover, Form S-11 for real estate offerings and the application of proceeds section of prospec-
tuses require the disclosure of certain forward-looking information. Schneider 260-62.
10. Schneider 259. Managements are not anxious to expose themselves needlessly to poten-
tial liability by making soft representations that may be difficult to substantiate and may prove to
be incorrect. Id.
11. The Commission, however, has not retreated from its prohibition of "specific future mar-
ket values," although the broad interpretation of this phrase, described in Gerstle v. Gamble &
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973), has been radically diminished. See Sec. Act.
Release No. 5695, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,212.
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1. The Risk of Misleading Unsophisticated Investors Through Dis-
closure. The primary purpose of the statutory disclosure system of the
Securities Act 12 and the Exchange Act' 3 is to provide investors with a
sound basis for making rational and informed investment decisions.'
4
Historically, the Securities and Exchange Commission has imple-
mented this goal through disclosure policies designed to inform and
protect unsophisticated investors.' 5 As a result, Commission practices
have often deprived the investment community of useful information
because of fears that the information might be misunderstood or given
undue reliance by less knowledgeable investors.' 6 For example, before
the passage of rule 175, the Commission confined disclosure in Com-
mission filings to historical or objectively verifiable information that
had a high degree of reliability. This policy led investors to assume,
justifiably, that all information in Commission documents had been
prepared with considerable care, and was thus accurate. Therefore, ac-
cording to the Commission's original view, if soft information appeared
in a filing, investors would assume that it too had a high degree of
reliability, that objective evidence supported the forecasts, or that the
predictions would almost certainly be fulfilled.' 7
Many courts have expressed similar concerns about the misleading
nature of projections.' 8 An often-cited example is Union Pacfic Rail-
road v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway,'9 a case involving a proxy
contest between two railroads in an attempt to take over a third com-
pany. In a report to shareholders, the defendant company predicted
savings of seventy-five million dollars from an anticipated three-way
merger. On the authority of a Securities and Exchange Commission
12. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
13. Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78o, 78p-78hh (1976).
14. REPORT 347.
15. Id. 348. In cases of perceived conflict between the disclosure objective of providing
meaningful information to the investment community and the objective of protecting unsophisti-
cated investors from their own ignorance, the former frequently has been subordinated to the
latter. Id.
16. Id.
17. Schneider 258. "[A]ccording to the traditional SEC view, the inclusion of soft informa-
tion in filings would clothe such information with an unduly high aura of credibility." Id. The
bootstrapping in this argument is readily apparent. If the public assumes that the information is
objectively verifiable, it does so because filings have been confined to hard information in the past.
If disclosure of soft information is allowed, these assumptions about SEC filings should disappear.
Id. 258-59.
18. See, eg., Comstock-Dexter Mines, Inc., 10 S.E.C. 358, 372 (1941) (estimates of mineral
resources stated as an entry on the balance sheet); Thomas Bond, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 60, 71 (1939) (use
of definite figures in estimates of future profits by a company that had not commenced operations
held misleading). But cf. American Kid Co., I S.E.C. 694 (1936) (projections with a reasonable
basis may be included in filings unless they give an appearance of unwarranted reliability).
19. 226 F. Supp. 400, 409 (N.D. I11. 1964).
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rule that cited predictions of earnings as its first example of what may
be false or misleading, the court held that the projection of earnings
was misleading per se.20 Judge Hoffman echoed the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's traditional view on earnings projections:
Bald statements contrary to concrete and historic fact run the risk of
ready refutation and exposure, and to that degree are self-policing.
Predictions, estimates, and opinions are more elusive and may pres-
ent graver dangers of misleading the investing public. They lend
themselves to this evil by allowing facts to be suggested or implied
without direct statement. Even if they do not tend to induce belief in
any particular fact, they nonetheless import the existence of unspeci-
fied facts which support the conclusion. The shareholder may be led
readily to assume, contrary to fact, that the predictor has special
knowledge or unique information to bear out fully his prediction,
and be induced to rely upon a supposed expert judgment of the mys-
teries of finance. . . . Whether the prediction is the product of an
intent to mislead or of innocent overenthusiasm, the misleading ef-
fect upon the investing public is the same.21
Conversely, it has been suggested that the assumption that inves-
tors will be misled underestimates the capability of investors, who are
generally accustomed to dealing with soft information through the nor-
20. Id. at 408. At that time, rule 14a-9 offered "predictions as to specific future market val-
ues, earnings, or dividends" as an example of what may be misleading or false. Since then, how-
ever, the SEC has amended the rule to remove predictions of future earnings and dividends from
the examples of what is misleading per se in a proxy statement. See Sec. Act Release No. 6084;
Sec. Act Release No. 5699.
21. 226 F. Supp. at 408-09. The court also quoted with approval from an article by Harry
Heller, a former member of the SEC Division of Corporation Finance. In the article, which is
perhaps the best defense of the SEC's practice, Heller explained the Commission's prohibition on
earnings projects as follows:
Since an expert can speak with authority only as to subjects upon which he has profes-
sional knowledge and since no engineering course or other professional training has ever
been known to qualify anyone as a clairvoyant, attempts by companies to predict future
earnings on their own or on the authority of experts have almost invariably been held by
the Commission to be misleading because they suggest to the investor a competence and
authority which in fact does not exist.
Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. LAW. 300, 307
(1961).
Another widely quoted commentator attacked the SEC's traditional position and criticized
the Union Pacific court for holding that the "projection was misleading just because it was a
projection, entirely apart from the question whether in fact it might have been sound." Kripke,
The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1151, 1198 (1970).
The courts and the SEC have since abandoned the traditional position. For example, in
Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Col. 1965), defendant's predictions of profits and
success of an invention did not violate the securities laws, because the court determined that there
were circumstances that made the predictions believable and it did not appear that the defendant
would have known of their falsity by taking reasonable precautions. See also Milberg v. Western
Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
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mal workings of the market.22 Investors certainly are aware of the in-
herent uncertainties of projection information, especially when
forewarned by cautionary language.23 In addition, even if a few inves-
tors fail to appreciate the reliability of forecasts, the benefits of making
more relevant information available to all investors outweigh the detri-
ment of a disclosure system geared to the lowest common denominator
of investor sophistication.24
2. Availability of Forecast Information to Investors Despite
Prohibitions on Disclosure. The Securities and Exchange Commission
has argued that even though the investor does not receive important
soft information in filings, the information is available to him through
other sources. The unsophisticated investor, for example, may receive
information from investment advisors. In this filtration process, sophis-
ticated investment intermediaries collect information about the issuer,
evaluate the offering, and disseminate their projections directly to in-
vestors as well as to a wide audience of securities dealers and salesmen,
who in turn use the projections in making recommendations to poten-
tial investors.25 Of. course, analysts must have access to management's
forecasts in order for the filtration process to operate. Many companies
are willing to disclose forecasts to analysts because the companies be-
lieve that attention from well-informed analysts has a positive effect on
stock values.26 Also, management may hope to quiet the public de-
mand for protection of individual investors to some degree by making
complex financial data available to analysts, who in turn make invest-
ment decisions for many individuals.
Proponents of forecast disclosure argue, however, that it is unfair
to inform analysts of this valuable information while denying access to
individuals who may wish to use this same information to make their
22. Schneider 269. See also Merrifield, Projections in SEC Filings: Debate Rages Over
Worth, in II SEC '74 at 149, 162-63 (1974), quoted in REPORT A-312.
23. REPORT A-312. But see Mann 231 (despite boldface legend on each prospectus stating
that the SEC has not approved the securities or passed on the adequacy or accuracy of the pro-
spectus, investors believe that the SEC has determined that the information is reliable).
24. REPORT A-312; Schneider 268. For widely traded securities, the understanding of so-
phisticates is believed to be impounded in the market price so that the unsophisticated can hardly
be hurt. See text accompanying note 116 infra.
25. Mann 226-27. A former member of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance stated
that the fitration process was one of the reasons Congress imposed a waiting period in the regis-
tration process: "The act thus operates to put the security dealer, who should possess the financial
and economic erudition necessary to analyze and evaluate the material required by law to be
included in the registration statements and prospectuses, between the investor and the company
and its investment bankers." Heller, supra note 21, at 301-02 n.6.
26. See note 88 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1980.607
Vol. 1980:607] SEC SAFE HARBOR FOR FORECASTS 613
own investment decisions.27 Moreover, if investors must rely on the
filtration process to receive necessary information, the Securities and
Exchange Commission's disclosure program has not fulfilled its statu-
tory purpose. Disclosure documents should furnish all information
necessary for both the professional intermediaries and the individual
investors to arrive at their investment decisions through independent
analysis.28
3. Fear That Disclosure of Forecasts Will Create Substantial Legal
Liabilities. Perhaps the most difficult problem accompanying any in-
creased publication of forecasts is the possibility of civil liability for a
projection that proves incorrect or omits material facts. 29 To tradition-
alists, the possibility of liability condemns a pro-disclosure policy for
several reasons. First, in some instances, corporations would disclose
and later be found liable for unintentional misrepresentations. Second,
and more likely, corporations would foresee the risk of liability and
either make no disclosures or make very conservative disclosures of lit-
tle value to investors.30 Furthermore, disclosure of forecasts in Com-
mission filings might bring undue pressure on management to perform
consistently with its predictions, contrary to the exercise of sound busi-
ness judgment. 31
Fear of liability is a legitimate concern that should be considered
27. Reiling & Burton, Financial Statements: Signposts As Well As Milestones, HARV. Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 45, 46-47. Proponents of disclosure also argue that investors should not
be required to pay analysts for important soft information simply because management dissemi-
nates company information in a discriminatory fashion. REPORT A-313.
28. Mann 227. See also Sowards, supra note 3, at 498-502.
29. At common law, projections were classified as opinions rather than facts. Therefore,
good faith projections that proved incorrect would not support an action for fraud or deceit. See
Crosby v. Emerson, 142 F. 713 (3d Cir. 1906); Robinson v. Parks, 76 Md. 118, 24 A. 411 (1892);
Dean, Public Dissemination ofProjected Earnings-Pros and Cons, 25 MERCER L. REV. 511, 531
(1974); Wise, Fearless Forecasts: Corporate Liabflityfor Earnings Forecasts That Miss the Mark,
17 CORP. PRAC. CoM. 501, 508 (1976). In contrast, numerous provisions of the securities laws
have been interpreted to create potential liability for inaccurate or incomplete forecasts. For ex-
ample, liability can be based on sections I1 and 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k-1 (1976), and
section 10b and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
The Wheat Report, a 1969 study of the SEC's disclosure policy, noted a corporate concern
that "problems of civil liability would be insurmountable unless projections in prospectuses were
expressly granted immunity" from suit. Wheat Report, supra note 3, at 95. The Report concluded
that the SEC's traditional policy should be continued despite the acknowledged value of forecasts
to investors. FED. SEC. L. REP., supra note 3, at 65,242. For a more complete discussion of the
liability doctrines, see notes 95-180 infra and accompanying text.
30. See REPORT A-313.
31. Id. A-314. One writer, who supports the SEC's exclusionary policy, concluded:
Even though management may be in a better position than anyone else to prepare them,
projections should be left to analysts and securities dealers and not forced on manage-
ment whose primary concern is and must continue to be the profitable operation of the
business. Management should not be required to expose itself or the company's assets or
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in any policy decisions concerning disclosure of forecasts. The poten-
tial for liability exists, of course, whether or not the Commission allows
the disclosure of forecasts in Commission documents. For example,
courts have found that liability could be based upon misleading fore-
casts disseminated through speeches and press releases.3 2 Nevertheless,
the potential for liability is a major deterrent to increased disclosure of
forecasts.33
B. The Securities and Exchange Commission's Rejection of the Ban
Against Forecast Disclosure.
Because of the Securities and Exchange Commission's efforts to
protect unsophisticated investors and its reliance upon the filtration
system to distribute soft information, few investors received sufficient
disclosure of projections.34 Disclosure in Commission filings was ex-
tremely conservative, with emphasis on negative, adverse, or pessimis-
tic factors, and contained more elaboration of the risks involved in
investments than of the prospects for earnings.35 One well-known com-
mentator concluded that "the prospectus ha[d] become a routine,
meaningless document ivhich [did] not serve its purpose." 36 The Coin-
existing stockholers to unnecessary risks, suits, and liabilities undisclosed in the balance
sheet.
Dean, supra note 29, at 534.
32. See, e.g., Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
33. Other traditional arguments against forecasts in SEC filing include the following: (1)
preparation costs will be excessive, Note, Disclosure of Future-Oriented Information Under the Se-
curities Laws, 88 YALE L.J. 338, 356 (1978); (2) disclosure of forecasts will weaken the firm's
competitive position, id. 357; (3) disclosure of forecasts will precipitate undue investor interest in
short term company performance, REPoRT A-312; (4) management will have the opportunity to
use forecasts as a device to manipulate security prices, id. A-314; and (5) prospectuses are
designed to disclose material facts, not conjecture and speculation as to the future, Mann 231.
34. Comment, The SEC Policyfor Projections.- New Problems in Disclosure, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
Rav. 242, 245 (1973). Moreover, reliance on the filtration process may have resulted in unequal
access to information as well as emphasis on who received the information first. Id. 245-46.
35. Schneider 264. In fact, SEC policies fostered this pessimism by requiring disclosure of
foreseeable risks that could adversely affect future operations, while excluding disclosure of simi-
lar predictions when they were favorable. Mann 225. See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
36. Address by Homer Kripke, Annual Meeting of Banking, Corporation, and Business Law
Section, New York State Bar Association (Jan. 27, 1972), quoted in Schneider 265. In Feit v.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the court stated in refer-
ence to prospectuses:
In at least some instances, what has developed in lieu of the open disclosure envi-
sioned by the Congress is a literary art form calculated to communicate as little of the
essential information as possible while exuding an air of total candor. Masters of this
medium utilize turgid prose to enshroud the occasional critical revelation in a morass of
dull, and--to all but the sophisticates-useless financial and historical data. In the face
of such obfuscatory tactics the common or even the moderately well informed investor is
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mission responded by authorizing a public rulemaking proceeding to
reconsider whether, and under what circumstances, it should permit or
require the disclosure of forecasts. 37
In announcing the 1972 hearings, the Securities and Exchange
Commission chairman stated that "despite serious problems of reliabil-
ity and liability," forecasts do circulate and do affect stock values,
whether or not required or permitted in Commission filings. 38 Com-
mentators have gone even further to suggest that carefully prepared
forecasts are crucial to investment decisions because they are among
the most significant factors influencing securities prices. 39 In other
words, "[w]here the issuer is going, not where he has been, will deter-
mine future market prices and the ultimate success of the investment
decision."'40 This assertion is supported by evidence indicating that
members of the financial community determine the value of securities
by capitalizing projected future income.4 1 Similarly, an advocate of
disclosure maintained:
If there is any hope that the public or even the professionals can
make an informed investment judgment, it must start from a crystal-
lization of all of the plethora of information into a projection for the
future. The management is in the best position to make the initial
estimate; on the basis of it the professional or investor could then
make his own modifications. No other single change could add as
much meaning to the unmanageable and unfocused flood of facts in
present Commission documents. 42
almost as much at the mercy of the issuer as was his pre-SEC parent. He cannot by
reading the prospectus discern the merit of the offering.
Id. at 565. Bruce Mann has argued: "The real problem with the statutory prospectus is not that it
is unreadable but that it is unread. It is unread because it does not contain that information which
the investor considers crucial to his investment decision." Mann 223.
37. Sec. Act Release No. 9844, supra note 4. Specifically, the Commission called for consid-
erations of
whether projections should continue to be prohibited in filings with the Commission or
should be permitted or required; whether guidelines should be established for projec-
tions; whether standard assumptions for projections are feasible; whether a particular
format for the presentation of projects, or the independent verification of projections,
should be required; and to what extent there may be liabilities for projections under the
securities laws.
Dean, supra note 29, at 521.
38. Sec. Act Release No. 9844, supra note 4, at 82,323; Gormley, Financial Forecasts:
Problems and Considerations, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 32, 41 (1978). The 1972 hearings lasted 14 days,
during which 53 persons testified and over 200 others sent written opinions. Their comments are
summarized in [1972] 180 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-5 to 6; [1972] 179 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) A-7 to 10; [1972] 178 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-6 to 19.
39. See REPORT A-315; Herwitz, Projections andForecasts, 4 ANN. INST. SEC. REG. 323, 325
(1973); Mann 224; Schneider 280.
40. Mann 224.
41. See Kripke, supra note 21, at 1197.
42. Id. 1199.
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Since management is in a unique position to analyze the firm's
future prospects, proponents of disclosure argue that companies should
have the the responsibility, or at least the opportunity, to make fore-
casts in Commission filings.43 Such disclosure would not impose signif-
icant additional costs, at least for companies that already compile the
information for their own internal use. 4 Investors could use the pro-
jections to evaluate the quality of management and to check on infor-
mation provided by professional analysts.45
Studies indicate, however, that forecasts by management and ana-
lysts are not particularly accurate, and that they become even less exact
as they predict further into the future.46 The question, then, is whether
43. REPORT A-315; see Merrifield, supra note 22, at 163.
44. Gray, Proposalsfor Systematic Disclosure of Corporate Forecasts, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS
J., Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 64, 71; see [1972] 178 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-8 (witness at hearings
testified that forecasting is "already a way of life for most corporations"). Further, though some
companies may find it necessary to enlarge their planning and budgeting staffs in order to publish
forecasts, they arguably will benefit from internal use of the information. Gray, supra at 71. But
c Dean, supra note 29, at 522 (costs of publishing forecasts may outweigh any public benefit;
internal forecasts are used but certainly not in the form necessary for publication to those outside
the firm).
45. REPORT A-316 to 17. A commentator suggested:
It may be time for the securities acts to require the dissemination of information bearing
on the competence of management, information which will give the public insight into
whether management is doing its job by running the company in a proficient and profes-
sional manner ....
Disclosure of corporate planning processes, budgets and projections may be a step
in this direction. The mere disclosure of results of operations is not sufficient to test the
quality of management. It is not only important to know what has happened; it is
equally or more important to know how it happened and whether it was supposed to
happen. A test of management is whether it is realistic about the goals of the company
and whether it can orchestrate the dynamic parts of the company to obtain these goals,
whether management is efficient at planning and control.
Merrifield, supra note 22, at 168.
46. See, e.g., Basi, Carey, & Twark, A Comparison ofthe Accuracy of Corporate and Security
Analysts' Forecasts ofEarnings, 51 ACCOUNTING REv. 244 (1976); Cragg & Malkiel, The Consen.
ss and Accuracy of Some Predictions of the Growth of Corporate Earnings, 23 J. FINANCE 67
(1968); Daily, The Feasibility 0/Reporting Forecasted Information, 46 ACCOUNTING REV. 686
(1971); Gonedes, Dopuch, & Penman, Disclosure Rules, Information-Production, and Capital Mar-
ket Equilibrium: The Case ofForecast Disclosure Rules, 14 J. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 89 (1976);
Green & Segall, The Predictive Power oFirst-Quarter Earnings Reports, 40 J. Bus. 44 (1967);
Imhoff, The Representativeness ofManagement Earnings Forecasts, 53 ACCOUNTING REV. 836
(1978); McDonald, An Empirical Examination ofthe Reliability ofPublished Predictions o/Future
Earnings, 48 ACCOUNTING REv. 502 (1973). But c. Copeland & Marioni, Executives' Forecasts of
Earningsper Share versus Forecasts ofNaive Models, 45 J. Bus. 497 (1972) (management's fore-
casts are significantly better than those derived from naive models).
An interesting subsidiary issue is whether management forecasts are more accurate than those
of analysts. One study revealed that while management predicted earnings with "somewhat less
error and variance of error than their analyst counterparts," the difference between the two were
not "statistically significant." Imhoff, supra at 848. See also Ruland, The Accuracy oForecasts by
Management and by FinancialAnalysts, 53 ACCOUNTING REv. 439 (1978). But c. Basi, Carey, &
Twark, supra at 252-53 (management's inside information leads to better forecasts). Actually,
both types of forecasts are useful to the investor. The analyst has comparative information and
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investors receive any benefit from increased publication of forecasts
that are not reasonably accurate.47 Additional studies conclude, how-
ever, that regardless of their accuracy, forecasts convey information
that is valuable to investors.48 First, even if specific figures are not ex-
act, the forecast conveys management's assessment of the future direc-
tion of the firm-probably one of the best estimates available.49
Second, the act of voluntary disclosure itself usually means that man-
agement has good news, or at least that management's planning allows
it to be confident in its predictions.50 Finally, forecast disclosure affects
stock prices, so its relevance to the market makes it valuable to inves-
tors.5 '
Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission concluded af-
ter public hearings that management's assessment of a firm's future
performance conveys information of "significant importance to the in-
vestor" and is "relied upon in the investment process.' ' 52 Having
reached this conclusion, the Commission next turned to the issue of
how the forecasts were being disseminated.
In a 1973 policy statement on projections, the Commission ex-
brings objectivity to his forecast; management has special knowledge of internal factors and a
greater sensitivity to the particular firm. Gray, supra note 44, at 65.
In any event, conclusions reached in studies on the accuracy of forecasts are of limited useful-
ness in policymaking, since all of those studies necessarily examine only firms that voluntarily
engage in forecasting. Such companies, it appears, have unique characteristics that limit the infer-
ences that may be drawn from their experience and applied to all firms in formulating a disclosure
policy. J. Cox 269. For example, companies that voluntarily publicize forecasts generally have a
high degree of confidence in their forecasts at the time they are made. Basi, Carey, & Twark,
supra at 253. Furthermore, evidence indicates that management is more willing to make forecasts
when they expect earnings to increase than when they anticipate no growth or a decline in earn-
ings. J. Cox 269.
47. J. Cox 269-71.
48. See Gonedes, Dopuch, & Penman, supra note 46; Jaggi, A Note on the Information Con-
tent of Cororate Annual Earnings Forecasts, 53 ACCOUNTING REv. 961 (1978); Patell, Corporate
Forecasts of Earnings per Share and Stock Price Behavior Empirical Tests, 14 J. ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH 246 (1976). See generally J. Cox 267-93.
49. See REPORT A-315.
50. See Patell, supra note 48. See also J. Cox 269; Basi, Carey, & Twark, supra note 46, at
253.
51. Patell, supra note 48. See J. Cox 278. Professor Kripke stated:
Although the research evidence on the accuracy of projections is not encouraging,
this seems to me not to be the point. That investors pay attention to projections is con-
ceded. The time has come to end the SEC's excessive preoccupation with verifiable data
• .., to assume that the investor. . . can exercise a common sense skepticism toward
nonverifiable information, and to relax the rigidity of the disclosure process.
Kripke,.A Searchfor a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 293, 314 (1975). It is
interesting that the trend in the courts determining liability has been toward focusing on the rele-
vance, or materiality, of forecasts as opposed to their accuracy. See text accompanying notes 100-
06 infra.
52. Sec. Act Release No. 5362, supra note 4, at 82,667.
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pressed concern that management forecasts had been conveyed to out-
siders by informal practices that led to uneven and unfair
dissemination of forecast information.53 As a result, the Commission
determined that a change in its exclusionary policies "would assist in
protection of investors and would be in the public interest."'54 The
Commission decided, therefore, to take the first steps toward integrat-
ing projections into the disclosure system by permitting, but not requir-
ing, the publication of forecasts in Commission documents. The
Commission also characterized issuance of forecasts to outsiders as a
material event and thereby required full and immediate disclosure of
such communications.5 5 Rules detailing and implementing the Com-
mission's new policy on projections were forthcoming.
II. IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE FORECAST DISCLOSURE POLICY
A. The Securities and Exchange Commission's Initial Proposalsfor
Forecast Disclosure.
The Commission's first attempts to draft workable rules imple-
menting the forecast disclosure goal illustrate the formidable obstacles
posed by this problem. Over two years after the decision to encourage
forecast disclosure, the Commission proposed rules that permitted dis-
closure of forecast information, but required management to comply
with complex provisions requiring filings with the Commission and dis-
closure of particular information.56 In addition, in order to alleviate
53. Id. 82,666.
54. Id. 82,667.
55. Id. 82,665-66. It is important to note the Commission's characterization of this disclosure
as "material" because failure to disclose material facts creates liabilities under the securities laws.
See notes 95-111 infra and accompanying text.
56. Sec. Act Release No. 5581, supra note 4. See generally REPORT A-276 to 93. The pro-
posed rules would have required a filing with the SEC of every projection disclosed to outsiders,
with information on the circumstances of disclosure and the material assumptions underlying each
projection. The rules defined a "projection" as
a statement made by an issuer regarding material future revenues, sales, net income or
earnings per share of the issuer, expressed as a specific amount, range of amounts. . . or
percentage variation from a specific amount. . . , or a confirmation by an issuer of any
such statement made by another person .... A. . .note indicates that statements that
another person's projection is "in the ballpark," "attainable" or "on target" are examples
of a confirmation.
Sec. Act Release No. 5581, supra note 4, at 85,302. The proposal did not define the term "mate-
rial," but stated:
Any such statement relating to the issuer's total future revenues, sales, net income or
earnings per share would be material; a statement relating to the sales or revenues of a
subsidiary or of a particular line of business might be material, depending on the facts
... . Rules 405 and 12b-2 presently contain definitions of "material" which would be
applicable ....
Id. Companies were also required to publish forecasts previously included in prospectuses and in
annual reports to shareholders and the SEC, along with comparisons with actual results. Further,
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management fears of per se liability when forecasts were not realized
the Commission proposed a safe harbor provision that defined the cir-
cumstances under which a forecast could be made without liability.
5 7
The Commission, however, sought to restrict the safe harbor to situa-
tions in which there was a great likelihood of a reasonable forecast.
5 8
Hence, the safe harbor was narrowly defined.
5 9
These proposals met widespread criticism.60 The major concern
expressed by issuers was that the rules, although designed to widen the
availability of information, would actually cause companies to curtail
their disclosure for fear of liability or because they were unwilling to
start the cycle of required filings with the Commission.6' Moreover, if
management did disclose, costs would be incurred in documenting the
basic assumptions underlying the forecast and in filing the inevitable
revisions.62 Commentators were also critical of the vague language
used in the safe harbor provision. Subjective standards such as "rea-
sonable care," "carefully reviewed and approved," "reasonable factual
basis," and "good faith judgment" were viewed as invitations to litiga-
tion63 and as mere illusions of a safe harbor against liability.64 Fur-
thermore, the definition of "projection" was so vague that it was
they were required to disclose in SEC filings each revision of the forecast, or an explanation of
inability to do so, along with any reviews by auditors, and any reports the reviews generated.
Finally, they were required to file with the SEC their determination to cease making forecasts.
If forecasts were published in prospectuses, issuers would be subject to prospectus liability
provisions, which are the most stringent among the securities laws. J. Cox 268; see Securities Act
of 1933, § I1, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). Finally, the rules permitted, but did not require, filing and
publishing predictions of revenues and net income, with disclosure of material assumptions. Sec.
Act Release No. 5581, supra note 4; see Gormley, supra note 38, at 42.
57. REPORT A-286 to 87; see Sec. Act Release No. 5581, supra note 4, at 85,302.
58. The SEC did not provide any clear guidance, however, as to when a great likelihood of a
reasonable forecast might exist. Sec. Act Release No. 5581, supra note 4, at 85,303. See notes 151-
80 infra and accompanying text (criticism of SEC for lack of clear standards).
59. To claim safe harbor protection, issuers would have to meet certain requirements: suffi-
cient experience (defined as at least three years) in reporting and budgeting; preparation of fore-
casts with reasonable care by qualified personnel; and approval by managements at appropriate
levels. Disclosure requirements would have forced management to disclose, at a minimum, reve-
nues, net income, and earnings per share (each of which must be expressed exactly or within a
reasonable range of figures). The proposal also would have required disclosure of material as-
sumptions made in the forecast and the circumstances of any review by another party. Finally,
the projections would come within the safe harbor only if they represented management's good
faith judgment and had a reasonable factual basis. Sec. Act. Release No. 5581, supra note 4, at
85,303-04.
60. REPORT A-291 to 93; see [1975] 320 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-I to D-4.
61. SEc. REG. & L. REP., supra note 60, at D-1. In fact, many registrants indicated their
intention to limit significantly the flow of information to the investment community if the rules
were adopted. REPORT A-293.
62. REPORT A-291 to 92.
63. Id. A-292.
64. See Gormley, supra note 38, at 42.
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criticized for being excessively broad65 and not inclusive enough.66
Thus, although the majority of those who commented to the Commis-
sion favored a change in its disclosure policies, few supported the Com-
mission's proposal. 67
In response to the "important legal, disclosure policy and technical
issues raised by the commentators," the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission withdrew its proposals in April 1976.68 The Commission then
altered its policies. In the same announcement in which the proposals
were withdrawn, the Commission proposed guides 62 and 4.69 The
guides, which were subsequently adopted,70 indicate the practices that
the Division of Corporation Finance will follow in administering the
Commission's disclosure requirements. As proposed, they were neither
rules of the Commission nor expressions of the Commission's official
approval. 71 The guides state that disclosure of projections in Commis-
sion documents will be allowed, subject to three requirements: (1) they
must be made in good faith and have a reasonable basis; 72 (2) they
must be presented in an appropriate format;73 and (3) they must facili-
tate investor understanding of the basis for and limitations of projec-
tions.74
65. Id.
66. See Kripke, supra note 51, at 315. Another commentator suggested that (1) the prerequi-
site of three years as a reporting company may not be the proper standard for determining the
ability of a company to make a reasonable forecast; (2) there should not be a minimum require-
ment for the content of forecasts, since a company might be able accurately to predict revenues
and net income, but not fully diluted earnings per share; (3) instead of confining forecasts to a
narrow range of figures, multiple estimates based upon alternate assumptions should be allowed;
(4) the burden of proof concerning whether a forecast is protected by the safe harbor should not be
clearly placed on either party. Merow, SEC Proposed Rules: Civil Liability and Problems of the
Securities Firm, 7 ANN. INST. SEC. REG. 115-16 (1975).
67. Sec. Act Release No. 5699.
68. Id. 86,201-02. The Commission did, however, adopt a technical amendment that deleted
the reference in rule 14a-9 to predictions of earnings as an example of what may be misleading in
a proxy statement. Id. 86,201.
69. Id 86,202-03.
70. Sec. Act Release No. 5992, supra note 4. By the time the guides were adopted in revised
form in 1978, another guide had been adopted as guide 4; thus proposed guide 4 became guide 5
when finally adopted.
71. Sec Act Release No. 5699, at 86,201. When finally adopted, however, the guides ex-
pressed the position of the Commission that the making of projections was to be encouraged. Sec.
Act Release No. 5992, supra note 4, at 81,040.
72. The guides cite history of operations, experience in forecasting, and outside review of
projections as examples of what may provide a reasonable basis for forecasts. Guide 62, 1 FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 3822, at 3349 (1979).
73. In determining the appropriate format, the guides indicate that it may be necessary to
forecast revenues, net income, and earnings per share in order to avoid any misleading inferences
that may arise when single items reflect contradictory trends. Multiple projections based on vary-
ing assumptions (as opposed to a specific number or range) are allowed. Id.
74. The Division concluded that disclosure of the assumptions that management sees as most
significant to the forecasts would enhance investor understanding, although the guides do not
require publication of such assumptions. Id.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission's proposed action75 re-
flected a policy of tolerance that neither encouraged nor discouraged
the disclosure of forecasts, and that made no perceptible advance to-
ward resolution of the liability problem.76 The Commission took a sig-
nificant step in 1976, however, by appointing an advisory committee to
reexamine the entire corporate disclosure system.77 The committee's
recommendations served as the principal impetus for the Commission's
final adoption of a safe harbor rule.
B. The Securities and Exchange Commission's Disclosure and Safe
Harbor Policy: A Critical View of Rule 175.
The Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure addressed two
broad issues in its report78 to the Commission: first, whether there are
public policy and economic justifications for the Commission's
mandatory disclosure system, and second, whether the information
presently required in Commission filings is useful to investors, or if
other data that is now prohibited would be of greater use.79 In a thor-
ough analysis of the Commission's disclosure policies, the committee
concluded that the present mandatory disclosure system should be
maintained, but that the Commission should encourage greater volun-
tary disclosure of soft information in its filings.80 Despite disagreement
among the committee members on other aspects of the report, there
was virtual unanimity on the recommendations regarding the disclo-
sure of soft information. 81 The committee endorsed the Commission's
75. Sec. Act Release No. 5699.
76. Gormley, supra note 38, at 43. After the projections proposals generated so much contro-
versy, the SEC received little comment on their proposed guides. See Proposed Guidesfor Earn-
ings Projections Get Relatively Tame Response, [1976] 361 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-I to D-2.
77. [1976] 349 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-18.
78. REPORT. See generally Sommer, Survey.- Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate
Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission-Foreword, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 48 (1978).
79. Fiflis 104.
80. REPORT VI-XLIX, 344-79. A cost benefit analysis of the mandatory disclosure system is
beyond the scope of this Comment. The debate still continues over the worth of the system, with
the prevailing view taking the position that the benefits outweigh the costs. See, e.g., Benston, The
Costs and Benefits of Government-Required Disclosure. SEC and FTC Requirements-An Ap-
praisal, in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND REFORM 37, 67 (D. DeMott
ed. 1980) ("costs to society of government-required disclosure exceed the benefits that may be
derived therefrom"); Fiflis, Economic Analysis as One Phase of Utilitarianism, in CORPORATIONS
AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND REFORM 70 (D. DeMott ed. 1980) (utilitarian analysis,
of which economic analysis is but one part, fails to support the conclusion that the costs of disclo-
sure outweigh the benefits in a mandatory system). See also REPORT VI-XLIX; Kripke, Where
Are We on Securities Disclosure After the Advisory Committee Report?, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 99 (1978).
81. Fiflis 99. An explanation for the agreement could be that most of the recommendations
on the disclosure of soft information call for voluntary disclosure, while much of the disagreement
among the committee members focused on whether there should be a mandatory disclosure sys-
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departure from its traditional posture by recommending that the Com-
mission actively encourage the disclosure of soft information. In addi-
tion, the committee proposed a safe harbor provision to facilitate such
voluntary disclosure.8 2
In response to the committee report, the Commission adopted rule
175, which creates a safe harbor for financial forecasts. 83 The rule is
designed to encourage disclosure of projections by protecting issuers
from liability for projections that are voluntarily disclosed in Commis-
tern, as at present. Id. Chairman Sommer supported a mandatory disclosure system rather than
the voluntary disclosure favored by the committee. See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
82. [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,357, at 88,663, One writer of-
fered the following evaluation of the Report's recommendations:
Assuming that investors will engage in some form of fundamental analysis, these
recommendations for increased disclosure will greatly increase the available relevant ev-
idence of a firm's prospects, albeit with less than fully reliable data. Moreover, the ex-
periment will test the hypothesis of those critics who suggest that market forces will cause
managers to disclose meaningful data. And, to the extent disclosures are in fact made,
experience with them may reveal the need to take additional steps to further encourage,
mandate, or prohibit disclosure. A period of experimentation will also allow more time
for necessary research on portfolio analysis which, if its adherents' views are upheld,
might obviate the need for firm-oriented disclosure.
The Report, whatever it lacks in other ways, cannot be faulted for proposing careful,
yet progressive experimentation.
Fiflis 113-14.
83. Sec. Act Release No. 6084. The safe harbor rule as adopted, reads in part:
Liability for Forward-Looking Statements by Issuers Reg. 1 230.175. (a) A state-
ment within the coverage of paragraph (b) below which is made by or on behalf of an
issuer or by an outside reviewer retained by the issuer shall be deemed not to be a fraud-
ulent statement (as defined in paragraph (d) below), unless it is shown that such state-
ment was made or reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in
good faith.
(b) This rule applies to (I) a forward looking statement (as defined in paragraph (c)
below) made in a document filed with the Commission or in an annual report to share-
holders meeting the requirements of Rules 14a-3(b) and (c) or 14c-3(a) and (b) under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, (2) a statement reaffirming the forward looking state-
ment referred to in (b)(1) subsequent to the date the document was filed or the annual
report was made publicly available, or (3) a forward looking statement made prior to the
date the document was filed or the date the annual report was made publicly available if
such forward looking statement is reaffirmed in a filed document or annual report made
publicly available within a reasonable time after the making of such forward looking
statement.
(d) For the purpose of this rule the term "fraudulent statement" shall mean a state-
ment which is an untrue statement of a material fact, a statement false or misleading
with respect to any material fact, an omission to state a material fact necessary to make a
statement not misleading, or which constitutes the employment of a manipulative, decep-
tive, or fraudulent device, contrivance, scheme, transaction, act, practice, course of busi-
ness, or an artifice to defraud, as those terms are used in the Securities Act of 1933 or the
rules or regulations promulgated thereunder.
(e) Notwithstanding any of the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (d), this rule
shall apply only to forward looking statements made by or on behalf of an issuer if, at
the time such statements are made or reaffirmed, the issuer is subject to the reporting
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and has filed its most recent annual
report on Form 10-K, or, if the issuer is not subject to the reporting requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the statements are made in a registration statement filed
under the Securities Act of 1933.
(f) Notwithstanding any of the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (e), this rule
does not apply to statements made by or on behalf of an issuer that is an investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
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sion filings or in annual reports to shareholders.8 4 Rule 175 is simpler
and more direct than the Commission's original proposal and adopts in
large part the recommendations of the Advisory Committee.
1. Voluntary Disclosure of Soft Information. The Advisory Com-
mittee recommended that disclosure be on a voluntary basis initially.
The committee opposed a mandatory system because it felt that the
Securities and Exchange Commission did not yet have the experience
necessary to formulate specific rules for a mandatory system. Their re-
port also concluded that it was unfair to require all companies to sus-
tain the expenses and burdens associated with mandatory disclosure.
Furthermore, "many companies would [have found] it difficult to pre-
pare adequate projections due tb lack of operating history, or industry
conditions and should not be compelled to subject themselves to possi-
ble risks of liability for inaccurate projections."8 5 The Commission
adopted the committee's recommendation by permitting-but not re-
quiring-the disclosure of soft information.86
A drawback of the voluntary disclosure system, however, is that
issuers simply may decide not to publicize their forecasts. 87 The report
asserts that if the information is truly valuable, market forces, such as
investor demand and the companies' interest in having analysts observe
their progress, will compel production of the forecasts. 8  This argu-
ment presents a troubling anomaly: the Advisory Committee and the
Securities and Exchange Commission obviously believe that the infor-
mation is important enough to investors to justify disclosure, and yet
disclosure is not required.89 At the same time, the Commission re-
quires disclosure of other information that is far less important to in-
vestment decisions.90 This inconsistency has led some commentators to
suggest that a mandatory system would better serve the Commission's
84. Sec. Act Release No. 6084.
85. Sec. Act Release No. 5992, supra note 4, at 81,037.
86. See Sec. Act Release No. 6084.
87. REPORT 354. In fact, the Advisory Committee's investigation revealed that few compa-
nies to date had voluntarily included projections in their filings with the SEC even though regis-
trants were expressly permitted to do so. Id. 353 n.12.
88. Id. 354-55. A Financial Analysts Federation study indicates that analysts may be dis-
couraged from closely observing and reviewing a company if the company has poor disclosure
policies. Analysts' interest in a company may have a positive effect on its liquidity and stock
market price. Thus, there is incentive for companies to disclose their forecasts voluntarily. In
addition, when one firm in an industry discloses, others may be encouraged to disclose, and ana-
lysts can use the first disclosure as a lever to get information from other companies. Id. 355.
89. Sommer, supra note 78, at 55. Chairman Sommer concluded: "The Committee equivo-
cated, and the Commission continues to equivocate, with respect to 'soft' information." Id.
90. For example, the SEC has required disclosure of compensation of top officers. Id.
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goal of equitable dissemination of important investment information.9
Although there was support for such a recommendation within the Ad-
visory Committee, the majority concluded that the Commission needed
time to gain experience. 92 The Commission, however, has already
dealt with mandatory disclosure of soft information under other provi-
sions of the securities laws. 93 This experience should provide it with a
sufficient basis for establishing a mandatory system. If the information
is as important as the Commission, the courts, and the investors have
concluded, 94 disclosure should be required to allow all investors equal
access to the information.
A final reason for adopting a mandatory disclosure policy is to
avoid the contradictory policies created by the interaction of the volun-
tary disclosure rule and the principle that liability may be imposed for
misstatements or omissions of material facts. 95 Despite early indica-
tions to the contrary, forecasts, in effect, are considered "facts" for se-
curities law purposes.96 In addition, most forecasts will probably be
characterized as "material." Under the Supreme Court decision in
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,97 which established the test of
materiality for proxy rule violations, "a fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote."' 98 Courts have applied the test to
91. See Gray, supra note 44, at 67 (fairness requires more systematic disclosure but forecast-
ing should remain voluntary during initial trial period); Merrifield, supra note 22, at 154 (forward-
looking information should be made available to all investors because institutional investors pres-
ently have access to such essential investment information); Reiling & Burton, supra note 27, at 53
("decision whether to make public forecasts should not be in the hands of management"); Schnei-
der 270-73 (recommending selected mandatory disclosure supplemented by permissive disclo-
sure).
92. Sec. Act Release No. 5992, supra note 4, at 81,037; see Sommer, supra note 78, at 55.
93. See note 9 supra.
94. See note 51 supra, text accompanying notes 48-52 supra, & notes 95-99 infra.
95. Under the SEC's present policies, liability for a forecast could exist under the Securities
Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Particular provisions include sections 11 and
12 of the 1933 Act, which prohibit materially misleading statements in a registration statement or
prospectus and section 10 and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act, which create liability for fraudulent or
misleading statements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, 78a-78jj, 77k, 771, 78j(b) (1976); Comment, The
SEC Policyfor Projections: New Problems in Disclosure, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 242, 257 (1973).
96. See, e.g., G & M, Inc. v. Newbern, 488 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1973). This is significant
because forecast disclosure could occur in four types of filings, including registration statements
under the Securities Act of 1933, proxy statements, tender offers, and periodic reports under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In all of these disclosures the term "fact" is central in determin-
ing the existence of liability for misstatements or omissions of material "facts." Gillis, Disclosure
of Corporate Projections, FINANCIAL ANALYSIS J., Jan.-Feb. 1979 at 6, 72.
97. 426 U.S. 438 (1076).
98. Id. at 449 (emphasis added). Prior to TSC Industries, many courts applied the "might"
test enunciated in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970): whether a misstatement or
an omission "might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the
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determine materiality for other securities law purposes.99 Because
there is a substantial likelihood in many cases that investors will con-
sider forecast information valuable, courts frequently conclude that
such information is material under the liability provisions.
Thus, although the Commission's rule informs companies that
they may or may not disclose at their choice, in reality a failure to
disclose may create substantial liabilities. The liability problem arises
on two levels. On the first level, companies choosing to engage in lim-
ited voluntary disclosure may discover their attempts to limit the
amount of information disclosed thwarted by the obligation to disclose
all material facts. For example, in Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp.,100
the court held that forecasts that fail to disclose material facts may vio-
late the securities laws. The case involved a projection by a computer
company in a Securities and Exchange Commission filing that substan-
tial research and development costs of a new computer system would
be amortized that year. A vice-president of the company had also pre-
dicted in a speech to security analysts that the company's revenues
would exceed $105 million, yielding profits of one dollar per share.
The company failed to disclose, however, that the system was not yet
operational and that the company had not begun expensing the re-
search and development costs. In fact, the project was abandoned
shortly after the speech and the costs were written off. Profits were only
one-third of what had been predicted.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that failure
to disclose in the forecast that the system was not being expensed and
that there were other development problems may have been a material
omission under rule lOb-5. While it is not necessary to "detail every
corporate event, current or prospective, which has or might have some
effect upon the accuracy of an earnings forecast,"' 0' the court stated,
failure to disclose some or all of them may have influenced the decision
process of deciding how to vote." Id. at 384. This difference may be of no consequence to a jury
that is instructed as to materiality but it would assume significance when a complaint, as in TSC
Industries, seeks summary judgment and the issue of materiality is dispositive. The standard may
also serve to limit the quantity of disclosure. See 426 U.S. at 448-49.
99. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977) (test applied in a
10b-5 action when no advance notice was given of a short-form merger). Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) applied the following
test in a 10b-5 action: "whether 'there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor]
would consider [the omitted facts or misrepresentation] important in deciding' whether to invest."
Id. at 1040 (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. at 449).
100. 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974).
101. Id. at 491-92. The court further stated that when an earnings projection is made, "such
facts should be disclosed as are necessary to allay any misleading impression thereby created." Id.
at 492. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
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of a reasonable investor.
On the second level, now that corporations may no longer raise the
Commission's nondisclosure policy as a defense, the failure to disclose
forecast information may create liability for failure to disclose material
facts. In Felt v. Leasco Data Processing Equioment Corp.,102 which did
not involve a forecast per se, but rather another type of information,
the court emphasized that estimates based on less than accurate data
could be made as long as they were appropriately qualified, and that in
certain circumstances disclosure was required. Felt involved Leasco's
takeover of Reliance Insurance Company. A primary motivation for
the takeover was Reliance's substantial "surplus surplus,"' 0 3 which
amount Leasco did not disclose in its registration statement. Judge
Weinstein held that this omission violated section 11 because the esti-
mated amount of the surplus was a significant reason for the takeover
and thus was material information to investors.)0 4 The court was not
persuaded by Leasco's argument that it did not disclose the amount of
the reserve-because it had no information with which to verify its own
estimates.' 0 5 The court further stated that Leasco had no reason to be-
lieve that its estimates were so inaccurate that they could not have been
disclosed with a carefully drafted qualifying statement about their reli-
ability.'0 6 It is important to notice the court's emphasis upon the mate-
riality of the disclosure as opposed to the softness of the information.
The clear implication of the Felt holding is that it is the materiality of
soft information, including forecasts, and not its reliability, that com-
U.S. 875 (1977) (investors may be misled by failure to disclose fact that earnings estimates might
be significantly overstated due to accounting gimmickry).
102. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
103. "Surplus surplus" was defined in Felt as "the highly liquid assets of an insurance com-
pany which can be utilized in non-regulated enterprises." Id. at 551.
104. The significance of [Leasco's] intense interest in surplus surplus is that by failure to
disclose the size of the fund Leasco hoped to acquire, it effectively denied the Reliance
shareholders knowledge of one of the principal factors underlying the transaction. This
insufficiency prevented accurate evaluation of the degree of interest of Leasco. Knowl-
edge of the intensity of demand is essential to determination of a fair price in a market
economy.
Id. at 572.
105. Leasco maintained that it could not make an accurate estimate of the surplus surplus
primarily because the hostility of Reliance's management foreclosed access to the information.
Id. at 552.
106. Id. at 579. The court approved the following statement as an appropriate qualification:
[Due to reorganization plans there will be available to Leasco] approximatelp
$125,000,000 of excess surplus of Reliance. It is the opinion of Leasco that this amount
representsfunds which Reliance has on hand in excess of the legal requirements of its busi-
ness. No assurances can be given that such excess funds will ultimately be made avail-
able to the Company in such amount or that if so made available that such funds will be
profitably utilized by the Company.
Id. at 560 (emphasis by the court).
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pels its disclosure under the securities laws.
Another illustration is Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,l0 7 in which
the complaint alleged that a proxy statement was misleading because it
did not disclose the current value of certain assets or the company's
intention to sell those assets for a large profit immediately after the
merger. The defendants raised the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's exclusionary policy as a defense for not disclosing the estimated
value of the assets. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ac-
cepted the defense, but found liability on another basis. 0 8 As a result
of the Commission's decision to allow disclosure of projections and es-
timates, however, the exclusionary policy is no longer available as a
defense.' 0 9 In effect, the Commission's voluntary disclosure policy puts
corporations in a dilemma. On one hand, rule 175 instructs corpora-
tions to use their discretion in disclosing information. On the other
hand, if a court finds the information would have been important to
investors and yet was not voluntarily disclosed, the court could impose
liability for the omission of material facts. Replacing a clear prohibi-
tion with the contradictory and deceptive voluntariness rule imposes a
new and substantial burden on management. A mandatory disclosure
system would alleviate these difficulties by specifying the information
to be disclosed.' 0 If an effective, clear safe harbor were joined with the
disclosure requirement, I' management could disclose specific informa-
tion with the assurance that additional disclosure would not be re-
quired to avoid liability for omission of material facts.
2. Limitations on the Type of Information Protected. The Com-
mittee recommended disclosure of a broad range of forward-looking
and analytical information." 2 Under existing Commission guides,
107. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
108. Judge Friendly stated:
The SEC may well determine that its policy [against disclosure of asset appraisals in
proxy statements], while protecting investors who are considering the purchase of a se-
curity from the overoptimistic claims of management, may have deprived those who
must decide whether or not to sell their securities, as the plaintiffs effectively did here, of
valuable information, as Professor Kripke has argued. . . . But we would be loath to
impose a huge liability on [Gamble] on the basis of what we regard as as substantial
modification, if not reversal of the SEC's position on disclosure of appraisals in proxy
statements, by way of its amicus brief in this case.
Id. at 1294.
109. Fiflis 129-30, 145.
110. See text accompanying notes 177-80 infra.
111. If the rationale for a safe harbor rule is to encourage disclosure, the safe harbor arguably
has no function when disclosure is mandatory. In fact, however, a safe harbor could encourage
management to go beyond boilerplate compliance with mandatory requirements and disclose a
broader range of information.
112. FED. SEC. L. REP., supra note 82, at 88,667.
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management already is required to disclose an analysis of certain
financial data.1 3 The Advisory Committee endorsed this mandatory
disclosure, but suggested that the guides be amended to require more
qualitative than quantitative analysis.1 14 In addition, the committee
recommended voluntary disclosure of planned capital expenditures
and financing, management plans and objectives, dividend policies,
and capital structure policies. 115 In a significant departure from tradi-
tional Securities and Exchange Commission policy, the Advisory Com-
mittee also recommended that the information disclosed be conducive
to fully informed investment decisionmaking-that is, that the infor-
mation be aimed at sophisticated and knowledgeable investors. 1 6 The
knowledgeable investors would then be expected to disseminate the in-
formation to the general investors, and market prices would adjust effi-
ciently to the information as interpreted by the sophisticated
investors."t 7 An important implication of the report's recommendation
is that the disclosure of soft information should be permitted because
sophisticated investors have the ability to weigh the soft information's
relevance against its reliability. 18
In accord with the Advisory Committee's recommendation, the
Commission's safe harbor covers all projections of financial items, in-
cluding financial forecasts, statements of management plans and objec-
tives, and future economic performance. 19  Furthermore, and of
particular importance to the accounting profession, the Commission
rule not only covers statements made by management but also state-
ments made by outside reviewers on behalf of management. 20 The
113. A verification and explanation of financial information is currently required of manage-
ment in most 1933 and 1934 Act registration statements, annual reports, and other filings. See
Guide No. 1 for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 10,961, [1979] 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 23,060; Guide
No. 22 for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, Sec. Act Release No. 4936, [1975] 1
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 3782.
114. Management analyses are often "nothing but banalties" because their boilerplate charac-
ter provides little useful information to the investor. Fiflis 111. The Committee believed that the
discussions, which are currently presented in numerical percentages and figures, would be more
meaningful ifthey were described in qualitative terms. It recommended, therefore, that the guides
be modified to delete the numerical tests and to give broader latitude to registrants in deciding
how to explain their analyses. FED. SEC. L. REP., supra note 82, at 88,666-67.
115. FED. SEC. L. REP., supra note 82, at 88,668.
116. The report stated that "[t]he Commission should emphasize disclosure of information
useful to reasonably knowledgeable investors willing to make the effort needed to study the disclo-
sures, leaving to disseminators the development of simplified formats and summaries usable by
less experienced and less knowledgeable investors." REPORT D-9.
117. Fiflis 106.
118. Id. 107.
119. Sec. Act Release No. 6084, at 81,941.
120. Id. 81,942.
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safe harbor's protection is limited, however, to projections made in
Commission filings and annual reports to shareholders. The safe har-
bor proposal in the report, on the other hand, also would have pro-
tected projections disseminated by such informal means as speeches to
the financial community, press releases, and newsletters.' 21
Although rule 175 is a good initial attempt at encouraging the dis-
closure of information, the safe harbor as presently drafted does not
fully achieve its purpose. Although the Commission recognizes the
value of soft information to investors, it affords a safe harbor only for
disclosure of forward-looking statements. The rule does not protect
other useful information, such as evaluations of the integrity and quali-
ty of management, 122 and predictions of general market trends. Fur-
thermore, the rule protects only forecasts disclosed in Commission
documents and annual reports to shareholders. Companies probably
would be more willing to distribute forecast information to broad
groups of investors if the rule protected disclosures in press releases,
speeches, and other informal means of communication. Since investors
benefit from disclosure of forecasts that are reasonably based and made
in good faith, there is no reason to restrict the safe harbor to forecasts
made in Commission documents, especially when one considers the
more timely nature of informal disclosure.
3. Management's Obligation to Clarify Forecasts. The principal
value of a projection disclosure policy lies in enhancing investor knowl-
edge. The odds of achieving that goal may be reduced substantially
unless precautions are taken to insure that investors are given a reason-
ably complete and accurate understanding of the basis for the projec-
tion. Nevertheless, the rules recommended by the committee do not
demand disclosure of the material assumptions underlying a fore-
cast. 123 Scant justification was offered for not requiring disclosure of
assumptions, other than that permissive disclosure would maximize the
attractiveness of forecasting and provide time for gaining experience. 24
Commentators, on the other hand, have insisted that disclosure of
assumptions is essential to investor understanding.1 25 The assumptions
provide investors with a framework for analyzing the projection 26 and
121. Id. 81,938. The Advisory Committee's version seems more effectively to encourage wide
dissemination of forecasts to the investing public.
122. See REPORT A-353; Schneider 288-97.
123. REPORT 358.
124. Id.
125. Kell, The SEC'S New Disclosure Rule on Forecasts, 25 MICH. Bus. REv. 18, 19 (1973),
quoted in REPORT 358 n.20.
126. REPORT 358.
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enable them to assign an appropriate degree of credibility to the fore-
cast.127 In its comments to rule 175, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission recognized the significance of assumptions to investor
understanding of forecasts. Nevertheless, rule 175 follows the commit-
tee's approach and merely encourages disclosure of assumptions.
28
Rule 175's approach to disclosure of material assumptions is not
entirely satisfactory for several reasons. First, management may
choose not to provide investors with this information, relying on the
absence of any clear directive to disclose. Second, this reliance on the
rule's silence may be misplaced, as management may in fact be subject
to liability for its failure to disclose. As the Commission warned, under
certain circumstances disclosure of assumptions may be material to an
understanding of the projected results. In such cases, disclosure of as-
sumptions is mandatory under other provisions of the securities
laws. 29 Moreover, disclosure of key assumptions underlying a forecast
may be necessary in order to meet the reasonable basis and good faith
standards of the safe harbor rule.' 30 An additional hidden possibility
for liability arises because courts and the Securities and Exchange
Commission impose a.duty to correct forecasts that have become mis-
leading. Under existing requirements of the securities laws, manage-
ment is responsible for making full and piompt disclosure of material
facts, both positive and negative, when it knows its earlier statements
no longer have a reasonable basis.' 3' The Commission, in its release
describing rule 175, explicitly imposes the same duty to correct on man-
agements that disclose projections. Depending on the circumstances, a
duty to correct arises if the projections have become inaccurate by vir-
tue of subsequent events, or are later discovered to have been mislead-
ing or false from the outset and management has reason to know that
persons are continuing to rely on the information.' 32
The court in Green v. Jonhop133 extended this affirmative duty by
127. Schneider 277. See also notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
128. Sec. Act Release No. 6084 at 81,942.
129. Id. See notes 100-06 supra & 154-58 infra and accompanying text.
130. Sec. Act Release No. 6084, at 81,942. See notes 159-80 infra and accompanying text,
131. See Sec. Act Release No. 5992, supra note 4.
132. Sec. Act Release No. 6084, at 81,943; see, e.g., SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297
F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (corporation president's failure to correct a press release that had
become false and misleading). See also Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (ac-
countant's failure to disclose later finding of falsity in financial statements that were included in
annual reports to shareholders and filings with SEC). Whether the projections have become mate-
rially misleading will depend on factors such as the length of time between the making of the
forecast and the occurrence of the subsequent event and the magnitude of the deviation. Sec. Act
Release No. 6084, at 81,943-44.
133. 358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Or. 1973).
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requiring a company to correct a misleading earnings projection made
by an outside source associated with the company. In this case, an un-
derwriter projected that earnings would triple. The court concluded
that there was no reasonable basis for the prediction, and held the com-
pany liable under rule lOb-5 for failure to correct the underwriter's
misleading statement when management knew the projection was in
circulation.134
Rule 175's silence on disclosure of assumptions and the duty to
correct is a disservice both to investors and management. This ap-
proach provides no assurance that this valuable information will be
produced for the investor, and it arguably misleads management con-
cerning its obligations and potential liabilities. 35 The interests of both
groups would be advanced if these requirements were clearly defined.
4. The Safe Harborfor Projections. Unlike the Securities and
Exchange Commission in its 1976 release, 36 the Advisory Committee
concluded that a safe harbor is necessary if firms are to be expected to
disclose forecasts voluntarily. The Commission had determined that a
safe harbor was not needed because projections made in good faith
with a reasonable basis would not subject issuers to liability.' 37 Since
the case law defining good faith and reasonable basis is unsettled, how-
ever, there is reason to believe that a safe harbor is necessary to relieve
some of the fear of liability held by those who would disclose soft infor-
mation.138 The committee's report, therefore, proposed a broad safe
harbor to protect soft information disclosed both through informal
communications and in Commission documents. 39 The burden would
be on the plaintiff to prove that the forecast lacked a reasonable basis
134. The court stated that a company is "obligated to take some action when it learns of such
misstatements or omissions and is aware that their publication or nonpublication will be mislead-
ig to members of the investing public." Id. at 420.
135. See notes 100-06 supra & 154-59 infra and accompanying text.
136. Sec. Act Release No. 5699.
137. Id.
138. REPORT 363, A-378. See notes 149-80 infra and accompanying text.
139. The report proposed the following safe harbor, which is virtually identical to the SEC's
safe harbor for replacement cost information:
A statement of a management projection of future company economic performance or a
statement of management plans and objectives for future company operations shall be
deemed not to be an untrue statement of material fact; a statement false or misleading
with respect to any material fact; an omission to state a material fact necessary to make a
statement not misleading; or the employment of a manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent
device, contrivance, scheme, transaction, act, practice, course of business, or an artifice to
defraud, as those terms are used in the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, or the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, or rules and regulations
thereunder, unless such information:
(I) Was prepared without a reasonable basis; or
(2) Was disclosed other than in good faith.
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or was not made in good faith.' 40
Although the Commission's general response to the Advisory
Committee's recommendations was favorable, 4 1 there were specific
points of disagreement. The Commission, therefore, proposed two ver-
sions of a safe harbor rule for public comment. Version A, the more
conservative proposal, would have protected only "statements made by
or on behalf of the issuer .... ,, 142 The protection would be limited to
forecasts of financial items such as revenue, income, and earnings per
share. To qualify for protection from liability, the defendant would
have to prove that the projection was prepared with a reasonable basis
and disclosed in good faith.' 43 Version B proposed adoption of the
REPORT 364. The Committee believed that its safe harbor was consistent with the present state of
the law as reflected in recent court opinions. Id. 364.
140. REPORT 364; see [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) S 81,357, at 88,672.
Other recommendations of the Advisory Committee concerning projections were:
a. .*. . comparisons of projections with actual results, including management anal-
ysis of any significant variance, should be encouraged but not required;
b. The items of information to be forecasted should rest within the discretion of
management, but should be those most relevant in evaluating the company's securities
and should not be items whose projection would create materially misleading inferences;
c. Third party review of management projections should be permitted but not re-
quired;
d. Projections previously issued by management having currency at the time a re-
gistration statement is filed should be required to be included in the registration state-
ment in their original form, or where necessary, in modified form;
e. The time period to be covered by the projection should rest within the discretion
of management; and
f. Inclusion of projections in one Commission filing should not "lock" the regis-
trant into including projections in future filings; likewise, registrants should be permitted
to resume the inclusion of projections in filings after a prior discontinuance. However,
companies should be encouraged not to discontinue or resume projections in filings with-
out good cause.
REPORT 345-46.
141. See Preliminary Response of the Commission to the Recommendations of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Corporate Disclosure, Sec. Act Release No. 5906, supra note 4.
142. Sec. Act release No. 5993, at 81,043. This provision, which would protect statements of
an outside reviewer of management's forecasts, differs substantially from the Advisory Commit-
tee's recommendation, which applied to management's statements and did not specifically protect
statements by third party reviewers or define "management." Id.
143. The Commission specifically invited comment on the effect that placement of the burden
would have on the SEC's goal of encouraging the disclosure of forecasts. Id. 81,044. The SEC
offered the following explanation for placing the burden on the defendant:
The Commission is proposing the rule in this manner since it is concerned that the
burden imposed on a plaintiff-including the Commission--could be insurmountable. It
would be extremely difficult to prove the absence of a reasonable basis or good faith,
especially as to plaintiffs who would not have the Commission's investigatory procedures
available and cannot engage in discovery prior to the filing of a complaint alleging a
violation.
Moreover, Version A reflects the recognition that an issuer likely would be in a
better position to prove that a projection was prepared with a reasonable basis and dis-
closed in good faith by virtue of its access to all the facts and circumstances surrounding
the disclosure of a particular projection for which protection under the rule would be
sought.
Id. (citation omitted).
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report's recommendations. 44 The safe harbor provision that the Com-
mission finally adopted is a hybrid of these two versions.
a. Burden ofproof. Under rule 175 the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing both that a projection lacks reasonable basis and that it
was not disclosed in good faith. 145 The deterrent effect of placing the
burden on the defendant was viewed as contrary to the Commission's
goal of encouraging forecasts. In addition, commentators feared that
the number of frivolous suits would increase, resulting in a considera-
ble time and cost burden for management. 46
In the past, some of the statutory liability provisions placed the
burden of proof on the defendant, because the Commission believed
that the burden would be insurmountable for plaintiffs with no inside
knowledge of a company's activities. 47 The case law demonstrates,
however, that liberal discovery procedures, the availability of public
information, and the Commission's broad investigatory powers provide
plaintiffs with the tools necessary to prove their cases against defend-
ants. 148 The safe harbor rules may also work to the advantage of plain-
tiffs. Although the safe harbor was designed to be an affirmative
defense for issuer defendants who met its two-pronged standard, it is
likely that plaintiffs will use the Commission's standards to establish a
144. Id. 81,041-42; Gillis, supra note 96, at 77. Both versions of the rule protect disclosures in
SEC documents and by informal means. Version A limits protection to disclosures made by SEC
registrants and reporting firms, and does not protect forecasts made by registered investment com-
panies. Version B is not so limited. Sec. Act Release No. 5993. On the same day that the SEC
proposed the two versions of the safe harbor, it adopted guide 62 under the Securities Act and
guide 5 under the Securities Exchange Act. Sec. Act Release No. 5992, supra note 4. See notes 69-
76 supra and accompanying text.
145. Sec. Act Release No. 6084, at 81,940.
146. Id.
147. See id. In drafting liability sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, Congress
expressed this same concern:
Every lawyer knows that with the facts in the control of the defendant it is practically
impossible for a buyer to prove a state of knowledge or a failure to exercise due care on
the part of the defendant. Unless responsibility is to involve merely paper liability it is
necessary to throw the burden of disproving responsibility for reprehensible acts of omis-
sion or commission on those who purport to issue statements for the public's reliance.
The responsibility imposed is no more or less than that of a trust. It is a responsibility
that no honest banker and no honest businessman should seek to avoid or fear. To
impose a lesser responsibility would nullify the purposes of this legislation. To impose a
greater responsibility, apart from constitutional doubts, would unnecessarily restrain the
conscientious administration of honest business with no compensating advantage to the
public.
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933). However, two existing SEC safe harbor rules
for replacement cost information, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17(g) (1979), and oil and gas reserve disclo-
sures under regulation SX, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-18(k)(6)(v) (1979), place the burden on the plaintiff.
148. See Sec. Act Release No. 6084, at 81,940; see e.g., Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507
F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974) (summary judgment for defendants overruled); Green v. Jonhop, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Or. 1973) (management liable for not correcting a misleading forecast).
DUKE LAW JOUAVTAL
general standard of liability. The result of this tactic probably will be
that any forecast that fails to meet the Commission's standards will be
found misleading. 149
b. Standards of goodfaith and reasonable basis. The experimen-
tal nature of voluntary disclosure and the possibility of placing undue
reliance on projections led the Commission to determine that there
must be a good faith standard in the safe harbor rule. 150 Critics at-
tacked earlier proposals that included this requirement because of both
the ambiguity of the term and the lack of any objective standards for
determining compliance.' 5' Furthermore, the rule requires that fore-
casts have a reasonable basis. Unlike earlier proposals, however, the
rule contains no discussion of the factors demonstrating a reasonable
basis.' 52
-One major criticism of the rule's approach is that a prinicipal goal
of an effective safe harbor is to create certainty for the disclosing corpo-
ration. If the rule itself provided precisely drawn standards backed by
examples, certainty would be increased. Even absent precise rules,
greater certainty could result if the terms and standards employed in
the rule were judicially well defined. Yet, an analysis of the judicial
liability sandards developed in the general area of soft information
reveals that while certain trends are evident, the courts have not relied
on any one standard. 53 Moreover, few courts have had an opportunity
to examine forecasts in the context of the Commission's present poli-
cies. Cases in collateral areas that deal with the good faith and reason-
able basis standards provide no consistent answers.
The court in Beecher v. Able, 154 for example, used a strict standard
for assessing the misleading nature of projections. In this case, pur-
chasers of debentures brought an action against an aerospace manufac-
turer based on the company's projection in its prospectus that it would
149. See Gillis, Legal Aspects of Corporate Forecasts, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb.
1973, at 72, 76.
150. Sec. Act Release No. 6084, at 81,940-41. All of the proposed safe harbor rules have had a
good faith requirement. See, e.g., Sec. Act Release No. 5581, supra note 4; REPORT 364. The
Report's proposed safe harbor is very similar to the SEC's safe harbor for replacement cost infor-
mation. Id.
151. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
152. Several commentators have suggested that a good faith requirement is superfluous, since
a projection with a reasonable basis should be treated as having been made in good faith. Sec. Act
Release No. 6084, at 81,941. The SEC response was that numerous security laws contain separate
good faith requirements. Id; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(a), 78r(a), 78bb(e)(l), 80a-2(a)(41)(A)
(1976) (good faith requirements under other provisions of the securities laws).
153. REPORT A-330. See notes 154-75 infra and accompanying text.
154. 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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make nominal income at best.155 Plaintiffs claimed that the statement
was a prediction that the company would break even. As such, the
statement was a material misrepresentation, since the company suffered
a disastrous loss of $52 million for the year. The company argued that
the projection was a warning that if there were any profits the amount
would be nominal.
In finding a violation, the court held that "an appreciable number
of ordinarily prudent investors would have read the statement as a
forecast that substantial losses were improbable,"' 56 and thus, the cor-
poration had not met the "high standard of care" imposed on those
who voluntarily make projections.-57 The court held that projections
"must be based on facts from which a reasonably prudent investor
would conclude that it was highly probable that the forecast would be
realized."' 58 Moreover, material underlying assumptions must be dis-
closed to prevent the forecast from being misleading. 59
The Beecher court's "highly probable" test has not been followed
by other courts. Instead, courts have focused on three general require-
ments in determining liability: (1) good faith; (2) reasonable basis; and
(3) appropriate qualification and explanation of the projections. Sev-
eral cases provide examples of how courts have struggled to define
these concepts. The earliest projection cases established the good faith
requirement. As Judge Learned Hand said in one such case, "[I]t has
been the law ever since 1896, that to promise what one does not mean
to perform, or to declare an opinion as to future events which one does
not hold, is a fraud." 60 Other courts have continued this basic require-
155. The action was brought under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(1976), which provides a cause of action for a person who has purchased a security pursuant to a
registration statement and prospectus that either contained an untrue statement of a material fact
or failed to state a material fact.
156. 374 F. Supp. at 347.
157. Id. at 347-48.
158. Id. at 348 (footnote omitted).
159. Id. The court did, however, explain that "[all projections will be based on numerous
assumptions, some of which are so reasonable and so likely to be borne out by the facts that they
may be left unstated." Id. at 348 n.6. But Cf Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 668 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (disclosure of assumptions not required), a 'dper curiam, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972). In
addition, the Beecher court considered the company's poor forecasting record and its reliance on
unreasonable, as well as undisclosed, assumptions as evidence that the projection was misleading.
The court stated that the company should have disclosed the fact that its previous forecasts had
failed, so that investors would know that the company's forecasting techniques were faulty or that
adverse conditions affecting the company made it difficult to make reliable forecasts. The court
also maintained that the company should have disclosed its assumption that substantial improve-
ments would be made in the Aircraft Division in order to avoid substantial losses. 374 F. Supp. at
354.
160. United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1948) (footnote omitted). This case
involved predictions of enormous oil profits. The argument was made that opinions, promises, or
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ment of a good faith belief in the projection at the time it is made.1 61 In
addition, most courts have required that the underlying data and
method of preparation provide a reasonable basis for the projection.
The leading case of Dolgow v. Anderson162 illustrates the applica-
tion of the reasonable basis requirement. Monsanto Corporation and
its officers were sued under rule lOb-5 for predicting an increase in
earnings when there was in fact a ten-percent decline in net income.
The court held that the projection was neither misleading nor fraudu-
lent, however, because of Monsanto's thorough preparation and careful
documentation of the projection. 63 The Dolgow court considered nu-
merous factors in finding that the projection was reasonably based.
Monsanto had a program for advising the public of the results of past
operations and of future prospects;164 the company's internal docu-
ments were appropriately prepared and extensively reviewed by all
levels of management;165 internal data supported the projections when
they were made; and the projections were constantly updated and re-
vised.166 The court concluded that the projections were made honestly,
were reasonable, and were the best estimates available to manage-
ment.167 In addition, it was possible to attribute the decline in income
to several unanticipated economic events that affected the profits of the
industry as a whole.168
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Marx v. Compt/er
Sciences Corp. ,169 held that a forecast of earnings is misleading if either
representations about the future would not support a charge of fraud. The court held just the
opposite.
161. See, e.g., Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1974);
Schuller v. Slick Corp., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,065 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
162. 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aj'dper curiam, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972).
163. 53 F.R.D. at 686.
164. Id. at 674.
165. Id. at 676.
166. Id. at 676-77.
167. Id. at 676, 679.
168. Id. at 673. Several commentators have read Dolgow very broadly. For example, one
commentator concluded that the Dolgow court provides a safe harbor for inaccurate projections
that were made in "good faith and with reasonable prudence." Schneider 304. Another suggests
that the court "clearly applied a negligence standard, based on the 'reasonable businessman,' and
seemingly was very tolerant of missed forecasts caused by external events that were unforesee-
able." Wise, supra note 29, at 515-16; 5f REA Express, Inc. v. Interway Corp., 410 F. Supp. 192,
196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (company publicized a prediction based on data made obsolete by a
change in business conditions; court held "[a]bsent a reasonable method of preparation or a valid
basis, reckless and unfounded statements as to future earnings ... are sufficiently misleading to
be actionable under Rule lOb-5").
169. 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974).
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good faith or a reasonable basis is lacking.' 70 As discussed earlier,' 7'
the company had inaccurately projected that certain costs would be
amortized and profits would be substantial. In formulating a liability
standard, the court assumed that the prediction was a material fact and
proceeded to determine whether it was untrue:
Of course in hindsight it turned out to be wrong. But at least in the
case of a prediction as to the future, that in itself does not make the
statement untrue when made. However, the forecast may be re-
garded as a representation that on January 23, 1970, CSC's informed
and reasonable belief was that at the end of the coming period, earn-
ings would be approximately $1.00. That is what a reasonable inves-
tor would take the statement to mean, and we believe it would be
"untrue" when made if CSC did not then believe earnings would be
in that amount or knew that there was reason to believe they would
not be. In addition, because such a statement implies a reasonable
method of preparation and a valid basis, we believe also that it
would be "untrue" absent such preparation or basis.' 72
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Polin v. Conduc-
tron Corp. ,173 suggested a slight variation in the standard employed in
Marx. The court held that a forecast by an electronics corporation did
not constitute a misrepresentation even though the forecast was made
without a reasonable basis. According to the court, when reliable in-
formation is not available, it is sufficient for the firm to explain the
uncertainties and inadequacies of the forecast because such explana-
tion and qualification coupled with good faith will prevent a misrepre-
sentation. 174
These cases demonstrate that the courts have not developed uni-
form standards for determining liability for forecasts that prove inaccu-
rate. At most, an analysis of the cases shows that the potential for
liability is greater if a forecast is not made in good faith and with a
170. Id. at 490.
171. See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
172. 507 F.2d at 489-90. See also Schuller v. Slick Corp., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc.L. REP. (CCH) % 95,065, at 97,739 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
173. 552 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977).
174. 552 F.2d at 806-08. See also SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In
Goelek, an estimate in a prospectus was worded as follows: "while it is not possible to predict
accurately at this time the allocation of net proceeds, it is estimated that approximately. . . 5% [of
such proceeds will be utilized] for general and administrative costs." Id. at 753. The court held
that there was insufficient evidence to show that the prediction was other than a good faith esti-
mate of costs based upon certain new cost-cutting programs and an anticipated increase in the sale
of partnership interests in certain programs. Id. Similarly, Judge Weinstein, in Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), suggested that an unreliable
basis for a forecast would not be a ground for liability if it were accompanied by an appropriate
qualifying statement. The court provided an example of an acceptable qualification. Id. at 560.
See notes 102-06 supra and accompanying text.
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reasonable basis; but there is no consensus about the meaning of these
concepts. Furthermore, a forecast that meets the good faith and rea-
sonable basis standards may still result in liability if the projection is
not appropriately explained through the disclosure of underlying as-
sumptions or appropriately qualified by cautionary statements about its
reliability. 175 Finally, a projection that is made in good faith and with
a reasonable basis, but that omits material facts may also create liabil-
ity.
While these statements provide some guidance, their generality re-
flects the degree of uncertainty that exists in this area. Rule 175 merely
formalized this uncertainty by using the good faith and reasonable ba-
sis standards without elaborating how these requirements can be ful-
filled. It has been suggested, for example, that the good faith standard
under the rule 175 safe harbor incorporates the courts' requirement of
appropriate qualification and explanation. 76 Thus, a plaintiff alleging
that management issued a misleading forecast would have to prove
lack of good faith, reasonable basis, and adequate qualification and
explanation.1 77 An issuer might assume, however, that good faith sim-
ply means an honest belief in the truth of the forecast-the usual defi-
nition of the term under the securities laws. The rule does not indicate
which is the proper interpretation. Similarly, the reasonable basis re-
quirement is not defined or explained. It is unclear whether the term
means reasonable preparation, such as review by appropriate levels of
management and proper format, or reasonable underlying data, which
175. The appropriate qualification and explanation requirement has not been as clearly articu-
lated as the other two requirements, yet it appears to be a major factor in several of the cases. See,
e.g., Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1974). Although the SEC
did not explicitly include this requirement in the safe harbor rule, the 1976 proposed guides re-
quired that projections be presented in an appropriate format, and accompanied by information
adequate for investors to make their own judgments. See Sec. Act Release No. 5699. See also
N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL A-22 (1977) (adopts appropriate qualification re-
quirement); Fiffis 125, 145 (managers will be safe from liability for statements that are made in
good faith with a reasonable basis, and that are adequately qualified). See notes 167-74 supra and
accompanying text.
176. See J. Cox 292; Fiflis 125-26. The American Law Institute Federal Securities Code in-
corporates the definitions of fact and misrepresentation to produce a similar result:
Sec. 256. [Fact.] "Fact" includes (a) a promise, prediction, estimate, projection, or
forecast, or (b) a statement of intention, motive, opinion, or law. See also section 297(b).
Sec. 297. [Misrepresentation.] (a) [General.] "Misrepresentation" means (1) an un-
true statement of a material fact, or (2) an omission to state a material fact necessary to
prevent the statements made from being misleading in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made.
(b) [Estimates, etc.] A statement of a fact within the meaning of section 256(a) is not
a misrepresentation if it (1) is made in good faith, (2) has a reasonable basis when it is
made, and (3) complies with any applicable rule so far as underlying assumptions or
other conditions are concerned.
ALl, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT (1978).
177. Fitlis 125-26.
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is not outdated or unreliable, or both.
The solution is to set clearer standards, so that those who want to
disclose may do so with some certainty that liability will not result.
The task of clarification could be left to the courts; however, the prob-
lem of unpredictability would most likely remain, thus discouraging
companies that might otherwise disclose projections. A better ap-
proach would be for the Commission to provide the guidance for both
companies and courts by enunciating standards that are more precise
than catchwords such as "reasonable basis" and "good faith," and yet
are not as restrictive as the quantitative tests contained in the original
safe harbor proposal. 178 One commentator has suggested that the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission has refrained from providing clear
standards for disclosure because it fears that specific benchmarks will
facilitate fraud and will be expected to provide for every contin-
gency.' 79
A comprehensive approach, however, is not essential. Rather, the
Commission should be encouraged to establish guidelines only in those
areas in which satisfactory guidelines can be drawn such as by defining
reasonable basis and good faith. Clear standards under the safe habor
rule would be of substantial benefit to managements and their attor-
neys who must determine whether and in what form they will disclose
their forecasts. 180
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the securities laws is to ensure the full disclosure of
material information so that investors can make informed decisions.
The Commission has taken a step in the right direction by providing a
safe harbor for forecasts made in good faith and with a reasonable ba-
sis. There are several amendments to the rule, however, that should be
implemented in order for the safe harbor fully to achieve its purpose.
The most radical, and perhaps the most effective, amendment would be
to require disclosure of forecasts. A mandatory system would assure
investors access to valuable investment information and would relieve
management of the burden of deciding what it should disclose. At a
minimum, the Commission should require disclosure of assumptions
178. See notes 114-21 supra and accompanying text.
179. Blackstone, A Roadmapfor Disclosure vs. A.Blueprintfor Fraud, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 74,
79 (1978).
180. Id. 81 (suggesting that tests for materiality would be helpful in determining what infor-
mation should be disclosed).
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and corrections. In addition, the Commission should formulate clearer
standards to aid the conscientious in avoiding potential liabilities and
to direct the courts in establishing standards.
Kimbery Till
